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Hussein Ali Abdulsater
To rehabilitate a theological treatise. Inqādh 
al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar
Abstract: This article deals with a theological treatise that has been wrongly as-
cribed to the Imāmī scholar al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044). The treatise dis-
cusses the question of human agency in relation to divine decree and determin-
ing, arguing for positions that, to a large extent, resemble Murtaḍā’s known views. 
Nevertheless, the treatise also betrays features incompatible with Murtaḍā’s the-
ology as a whole, in addition to stylistic and bibliographical questions that make 
a good case against the work’s authenticity. This wrong ascription, however, has 
not been noted despite the repeated editions of the text in the Islamic world. As 
such, it misrepresented many of Murtaḍā’s views, sometimes undermining the 
main pillars of his theological system. The author of the treatise establishes his 
ethical concepts on the basis of scriptural dictates before proceeding to rational 
arguments, relies on non-multi-attested reports, defers to the authority of the 
Prophet’s companions and culls God’s names and attributes from the word of 
revelation. While going against Murtaḍā’s positions, these views – put together – 
are considerably closer to non-Imāmī doctrines, and could have easily been 
the work of a Muʿtazilī author. 
DOI 10.1515/asia-2014-0035
1
The arrival of the Shīʽī Būyids in Baghdad in 334/945 represented a historic turn- 
ing point for the Imāmī1 community; for although the new dynasty may 
have been originally of another Shīʽī affiliation, they clearly favored Imāmīs over 
others.2 The ʻAbbāsid Caliphate had long been weakened by mercenaries and lost 
1 The term ‘Imāmī’ will be used for ‘Twelver Shīʿī’ throughout the article; for the development of 
the term see Kohlberg 1976a: 534.
2 The particular Shīʽī sect to which the Būyids belonged has still not been fully determined. 
It may be said, however, that those members of the dynasty who were in Baghdad showed a 
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its iron grip under which Imāmīs had lived for almost two centuries, when their 
participation in authority was limited to a few notable families some of whose 
members held bureaucratic offices.3 The death of the eleventh Imam al-Ḥasan 
al-῾Askarī in 260/873 had left Imāmīs for the first time without a present Imam, 
generating a major crisis that compelled the community to devise new forms of 
management to sustain itself. Later known as the Minor Occultation, taken to 
have ended in 329/941, the effects of this crisis were still very much in evidence 
when the Būyids arrived.4 Their advent may have alleviated some of the strain 
that Imāmīs were living under, now that their political position had taken a turn 
for the better. The Būyids were to maintain control of Baghdad for a long century, 
only to be replaced by the Saljuqs in 447/1055.
The Būyid age was markedly one of tolerance and constituted a heyday of 
intellectual activity, termed both ‘the Shīʽī century’5 and ‘the renaissance of 
Islam’6. Probably owing to both their status as a minority sect and their not-so- 
privileged ethnic background, the Būyids showed exceptional acceptance of reli-
gious and cultural diversity.7 It is thus that debates on various matters were often 
held at the monarch’s court and in his presence.8 Many members of the ruling 
elite under the Būyids were men of learning, especially the viziers, a few of whom 
were among the great belle-lettrists of Islam like Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) and 
al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995), to mention but two examples.9 These influential 
political figures in turn had their own courts where they hosted the leading intel-
lectuals of the time, in this sometimes competing with their masters. The Būyids 
also paid considerable attention to the pre-Islamic Iranian heritage, reviving the 
Persian title ‘Shāhānshāh’ and some aspects of Sasanid rule while respecting the 
Islamic nature of government by nominally preserving allegiance to the caliph.10
stronger inclination towards Imāmism than did their relatives elsewhere, and that the second 
and third generation Būyids primarily gravitated toward Imāmism while first generation Būyids 
were Zaydīs. Their profession of the Ismāʿīlī creed, a claim not found in neutral sources, must 
have been very circumscribed and short-lived. On their religious identity see Busse 1969: 
604–605; Cahen 1979; Kraemer 1986: 39–44. Recent studies tend to stress their Imāmī affiliation 
even more; see Marcinkowski 2001: 201–202.
3 For a succinct survey of the prominent Imāmī families and their respective relations see 
Newman 2000: 19–26.
4 See Abdulsater 2011: passim for a discussion of the development of the Imāmī theological 
system and its undergirding communal ideology at the time. 
5 The Shīʽī color of the era as seen by a Sunnī intellectual is described in al-Qāḍī 2003: passim. 
6 For a discussion of the appellation see Kraemer 1986: 1–5.
7 Busse 1969: 605–606; Kraemer 1986: 75–80.
8 Kraemer 1986: 275.
9 On them see Kraemer 1986: 241–259 and 259–272 respectively.
10 Busse 1969: 603–604; Madelung 1969: 181–183; Kraemer 1986: 44–46.
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In addition to their support for religious scholars of different sects, the Būyids 
showed great respect for Imāmī scholars who had never before won government 
favor. The age represented the first period in Islamic history when Imāmīs were 
not only absolutely free to practice their beliefs and develop their creed publicly, 
but their religious leaders also enjoyed the patronage of political authority, be it 
in Rayy or in Baghdad.11 Extant are famous debates between Imāmī ʽulamāʼ and 
other scholars in the presence of Būyid princes where they openly challenged 
other schools and creeds;12 a favorable change whose importance should not be 
underestimated. The relationship between the Būyids and Imāmīs was a win-win 
situation: the Būyids needed popular support to balance the Sunnī support for 
the caliph; the Imāmīs, now without their Imam and therefore politically benign, 
needed political cover.13 This situation can best be seen, though in retrospect, in 
comparison with the subsequent plight of the Imāmīs, particularly their promi-
nent scholars, in the aftermath of the Būyid downfall.14 
2
ʿAlam al-Hudā ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (d. 436/1044), also known as al-Sharīf 
al-Murtaḍā, was one of the leading figures of the Būyid age.15 An ῾Alid, he was a 
scion of the seventh Imāmī Shīʿī Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799). In addition to 
this noble lineage, his more immediate ancestors and relatives were also of high 
regard: his maternal great grandfather was the Zaydī Imam al-Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh 
(d. 304/917), the third ruler of the Zaydī dynasty of Ṭabaristān and eastern Gīlān 
(250/864–520/1126) under the title al-Nāṣir al-Kabīr.16 His father Abū Aḥmad al- 
Ḥusayn b. Mūsā (d. 400/1009), known as al-Ṭāhir al-Awḥad and Dhū al-Manāqib, 
combined both religious prestige and political stature. He served as the chief 
11 For the distinctly favorable treatment of Imāmīs see Busse 1969: 605–606.
12 See for example the debate in the presence of Rukn al-Dawla (r. 324/935–366/976) between 
Ibn Bābawayh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991–992) and an individual who denied the existence of the 
Twelfth Imam; Ṣadūq 1991: 87–88.
13 Cahen 1979: passim
14 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 391; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 638; Dhahabī 1993: 18: 335.
15 See on him Thaʿālibī 1983: 5: 69–72; Najāshī 1996: 270–271; Ṭūsī 1997a: 164–165; Baghdādī 
1997: 11: 401; Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 104–106; Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 318–324; Ḥamawī 1993: 
4: 1728–1733; Ibn Khallikān 1993–1994: 3: 313–316; Dhahabī 1993: 17: 588–590; Ṣafadī 2000: 20: 
231–234; Iṣfahānī 1982–1995: 4: 14–65; Shīrāzī 1962: 458–466; Khwānsārī 1991: 4: 284–301; Amīn 
1997: 8: 213–219; Madelung 1985: passim.
16 On him see Strothmann 1979: passim. 
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syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib (naqīb al-ṭālibiyyīn)17 for five terms,18 in 
addition to being the commander of the pilgrims (amīr al-ḥajj),19 taking respon-
sibility for people’s complaints to court (wilāyat al-maẓālim)20 and acting twice 
as a peacemaker between the Būyids of Baghdad and the Ḥamdānīs of Mosul21. 
Murtaḍā’s younger brother Muḥammad (d. 406/1015), known as al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, 
was a renowned poet22 and a politician who assumed the office of the syndicate 
after his father;23 but he mainly owes his fame to his compilation of the sayings, 
sermons and letters of the first Shīʿī Imam ῾Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) under the 
title Nahj al-Balāgha24. The two titles Murtaḍā and Raḍī were both royal gifts: 
in a decree dated 397/1006, the Būyid king Bahāʾ al-Dawla (r. 379/989–403/1012) 
bestowed on ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn the title al-Murtaḍā Dhū al-Majdayn, apparently 
alluding to both his noble ancestry and personal qualities; Muḥammad, on the 
other hand, was given the title al-Raḍī Dhū al-Ḥasabayn.25
In addition to his political influence and social prominence primarily owing 
to his thirty-year tenure as the syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib following 
his brother’s death and his close association with both the ʿAbbāsid and Būyid 
dynasties,26 he was an authority on language and literature. As for his mastery 
of religious sciences, it was not confined to any particular discipline; he wrote 
extensively on jurisprudence, law, Qurʾānic exegesis and theology. As such, he 
was one of the icons of the Būyid ethos, not only in his well-roundedness and 
diverse knowledge but also in his efforts to systemize the Imāmī system of faith, 
simultaneous with the efforts of other masters of contending schools of theology. 
Murtaḍā markedly represents the atmosphere of relative freedom that the 
Imāmīs enjoyed; his contributions to the formation of an integral Imāmī discourse 
are foundational. In theology, his prolific output shows immense erudition, as he pre- 
sented a system of Imāmī beliefs whose elaborateness is unmatched by any extant 
17 Havemann 1993: passim.
18 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 8: 329, 395, 421, 483, 9: 23, 85, 112–113; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 8: 565–566, 
710, 9: 77–78, 105, 182, 219.
19 See Māwardī 1966: 108–112; Farrāʾ 1966: 108–115.
20 See Nielsen 1991: passim; Māwardī 1966: 77–95; Farrāʾ 1966: 74–90.
21 Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 8: 594, 630.
22 For an analysis of some of his poetry see Stetkevych 2007: 293–293 for his career; see also 
Djeblī 1997: passim.
23 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 127; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 263.
24 The authenticity of Nahj al-Balāgha has been a controversial issue from early times, at least 
before its great commentary by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) was written; Djeblī 1997: 33–56.
25 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 96; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 189; see Murtaḍā’s poem thanking the king 
for the title in Murtaḍā 1998a: 1: 403–406.
26 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 8: 483, 9: 23; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 77–78, 105.
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system from before his time. Murtaḍā’s theological legacy includes a lengthy 
summa, al-Dhakhīra fī ʿIlm al-Kalām,27 as well as dispersed works, some quite 
elaborate, addressing particular theological questions. His comprehensive book, 
al-Dharīʿā ilā Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa, is the earliest extant work on Imāmī jurisprudence.28
Murtaḍā studied language and rhetoric with the famous poet Ibn Nubāta al-
Saʿdī (d. 405/1014),29 poetry and adab with al-Marzubānī (d. 384/994),30 grammar 
with the grammarian and Mu῾tazilī theologian al-Rummānī (d. 384/994),31 ḥadīth 
with Ḥusayn b. ῾Alī Ibn Bābawayh (fl. late fourth/tenth century)32 and the head of 
the Imāmī community of Baghdad al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), with whom 
he also studied theology and jurisprudence33. The list of Murtaḍā’s students is 
indicative of the influence of his thought on Imāmī Shī῾ism, even if those students 
did not fully endorse their teacher’s positions. His most prominent student was 
undisputedly Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), later known in the 
Imāmī tradition as Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa. Ṭūsī is the author of two of the four books 
of traditions considered by Imāmīs to be the most authoritative, namely Tahdhīb 
al-Aḥkām and al-Istibṣār fī mā Ikhtalaf min al-Akhbār.34 Also among Murtaḍā’s 
prominent students were Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447/1055),35 Abū al-Fatḥ 
al-Karājikī (d. 449/1057),36 Sallār al-Daylamī (d. 448/1056)37 and Ibn al-Barrāj (d. 
481/1088).38 In addition to the strong bond between masters and disciples in the 
traditional Islamic world of learning, Murtaḍā’s finances must have guaranteed 
27 Initially intended as an independent work, al-Dhakhīra ended up being a complement to 
the unfinished al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī Uṣūl al-Dīn as Murtaḍā himself explains; Murtaḍā 1990a: 607. 
Therefore, the two works must be seen as one whole.
28 Murtaḍā 2009: 31–32 also refers the reader to his works on theology (i.e. al-Shāfī and 
al-Dhakhīra) and his Rasāʾil where he elaborated on some questions such as consensus, reports 
and analogical reasoning, which serves to prove that this work is still earlier than Ṭūsī’s ʿUdda, 
despite the latter’s earlier public circulation as might be construed from Ṭūsī 1997b: 1: 3–4. The 
late Calder was apparently unaware of Murtaḍā’s Dharīʿa, as he describes his jurisprudential 
work as “short, uncertain and lacking in detail;” Calder 1989: 60.
29 Ibn Khallikān 1993–1994: 3: 190–193.
30 Sellheim 1991: passim. 
31 Flanagan 1995: passim. 
32 Ṭūsī 1995: 434; he is the brother of the illustrious Ṣadūq, on him see Najāshī 1996: 68; Khūʾī 
1990: 7: 47–48.
33 On Mufīd’s life and thought see McDermott 1978: 8–22; see Murtaḍā’ eulogy of Mufīd in 
Murtaḍā 1998a: 2: 438–440.
34 Amir-Moezzi 2000: passim; Amīn 1997: 9: 159–167; Khūʾī 1990: 16: 257–262.
35 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 66; Amīn 1997: 3: 634–635; Khūʾī 1990: 4: 283.
36 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 53–54; Amīn 1997: 9: 400–401; Khūʾī 1990: 17: 357–358.
37 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 169–170; Amīn 1997: 7: 70–72; Khūʾī 1990: 9: 177.
38 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 115; Amīn 1997: 8: 18; Khūʾī 1990: 11: 42–43.
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him the ‘acquired loyalty’ of his students thanks to the concept of gratitude due 
for benefit rendered (shukr al-niʿma).39 
Despite his prominence and massive oeuvre, relatively little has been writ-
ten on Murtaḍā’s thought. In Western languages, two monographs offer a partial 
treatment of his contributions. First, there is the last chapter of McDermott’s The 
Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd.40 The chapter briefly presents the points of dis- 
agreement between Mufīd and Murtaḍā. Naturally, it does not exhaust all these 
points nor does it provide a systematic exposé of Murtaḍā’s theological contri-
bution as this is not the focus of the book. The other monograph is Madelung’s 
A Treatise of the Sharīf al-Murtaḍā on the Legality of Working for the Government 
(Masʾala fī ’l-ʿamal maʿa ’l-sulṭān). It consists of an edition of the Arabic text and 
an English translation, together with an introduction and concluding remarks 
on works dealing with related topics in the later tradition. In Arabic, almost all 
published studies on Murtaḍā are concerned with his literary works, whether in 
poetry or rhetoric and literary criticism. The only exception is a work studying his 
view on transmission of traditions, mainly covering his rejection of non-multi- 
attested reports.41 His theological works are mentioned tangentially, usually in 
the introduction. However, there exists an unpublished dissertation on his theo-
logy presented to the University of Zliten, Libya, by Raʾūf al-Shammarī in 2004. 
Despite its usefulness in many respects, it is noteworthy that it suffers from three 
main flaws: first, only Arabic material is used for both primary and secondary 
sources; second, the author is not aware of the publication of Murtaḍā’s most 
comprehensive theological work, i.e. al-Dhakhīra, among other books of his and 
third, the dissertation is replete with its author’s subjective views on controver-
sial questions as to whether Murtaḍā is right or wrong on each and every point. 
Although Murtaḍā’s theological contributions do not seem to have been studied 
independently in Iranian scholarship, several works have been produced cover-
ing his career in general and the religious aspects of his poetry. Translations of 
some of his works into Persian and a limited Arabic secondary literature on him 
are also available.
An even more interesting aspect concerning Murtaḍā’s reception in the later 
Imāmī tradition is the number of works spuriously ascribed to him. Thus far, 
the author of the current article has been able to identify three works that most 
likely are erroneously ascribed to Murtaḍā: Risālat al-Muḥkam wa-l-Mutashābih,42 
39 Mottahedeh 1980: 72–78.
40 McDermott 1978: 373–394.
41 Khaṭāwī 1997: passim.
42 See my forthcoming article “Resurgence and Spurious Ascription”.
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al-Ḥudūd wa-l- Ḥaqāʾiq43 and Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar – which is 
the subject of this study. The identification of these problematic works was done 
by the author in tandem with the larger project of his doctoral dissertation, con-
cerned with studying Murtaḍā’s theology and jurisprudence.44
3
In what is often termed as the fusion of Muʿtazilī and Imāmī theology,45 Murtaḍā’s 
role has been noted in both primary and secondary literature; many non-Imāmī 
heresiographers went even as far as classifying him as a Muʿtazilī46 or pro- 
Muʿtazilī.47 What matters most, for the purposes of this article, is that the concur-
rence of Imāmī and Muʿtazilī theology is most felt on two major subjects: divine uni-
city (with the pertinent issues of divine essence and attributes, including speech) 
and divine justice (with the relevant questions of human agency, divine help, 
moral theory and otherworldly deserts of acts). This is why the Imāmīs felt, early 
43 The author is currently preparing a separate article on the question of the authenticity of 
al-Ḥudūd wa-l- Ḥaqāʾiq. It suffices to say here that, unlike the other two works, doubts have been 
expressed about its ascription to Murtaḍā, though no reason for these doubts is provided; Naẓarī 
2008: 32: 26. 
44 See Abdulsater 2013: passim.
45 The debate on whether the Imāmīs incorporated Muʿtazilī doctrines or developed their own 
views independently is beyond the scope of the current discussion; each of the two opinions has 
its supporters. For classical heresiographies, see Khayyāṭ 1925: 6; Ashʿarī 1980: 35; Shahrastānī 
1992: 1: 145, 166; Ibn Taymiyya 1903–1904: 1: 31, 2: 7, 24. In recent scholarship, see for example 
Nashshār 1977: 1: 414–415; Jadʿānī 2001: 1: jīm-dāl, 371–372; Sourdel 1972: 233–234. See also 
McDermott 1978: 4–5; McDermott 1977: 223 where he states that Imāmīs, even before Mufīd, had 
some Muʿtazilī-leaning theologians; Madelung 1970: 15, 17, 25, 28; Jafri 1978: 305–306 (speaking of 
the early Imāmī theologian Zurāra b. Aʿyan); Lambton 1989: 93; Kohlberg 2003: XXIV; Bar-Asher 
1999: 11; Bayhom-Daou 2005: 23; Clarke 2006: 103; Schmidtke 2008: 154, 156; Gleave 2009: 1600–
1602; Amir-Moezzi 2005: passim (though only talking about a particular theological trend in 
Imāmī Shīʿism); Halm 2004: 49–50; Momen 2005: 79–82; Yann 1995: 5–6; Newman 2000: 20, 
26. All these studies argue, mutatis mutandis, that the Imāmīs fell under Muʿtazilī influence, at 
least partially on the level of some leading figures. For the other viewpoint inclined more to stress 
the independence or originality of Imāmī theology, with its different versions and the various 
extents to which such independence is stressed, see for example Ṭahrānī 1983: 1: 39, 5: 44–45, 8: 
56; Amīn 1997: 1: 127; Amīnī 1997: 4: 66–67; Niʿma 1985: 23–25; Mughniyya 1979: 110–111; Niʿma 
1961: 39–41; Ḥasanī 1964: 14–15, 279–284; Amīnī 1997: 24–25; Ṭabāṭabāʾī 1970–1974: 5: 78–80; 
Gurjī 1984: 43–47; Akhtar 1986: 102–115; Muhajirani 2008: 179, 181; ʿAbd al-Ghaffār 1996: 423; 
Khāminahʾī 1992: 199–210; Jaʿfarī 1992: 164–165; Abrahamov 2006: 208; Modarresi 1993: 115–116. 
46 Dhahabī 1987: 29: 434; Dhahabī 1995: 17: 589; Ṣafadī 2000: 20: 231; Ibn Ḥajar 1997: 4: 223.
47 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 319. 
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on, that they are no less entitled to the epithet ‘Upholders of [Divine] Unicity and 
Justice’ (ahl al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl ) than the Muʿtazilīs.48 Where Murtaḍā agrees with 
Muʿtazilī theology, he champions the positions of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs against 
that of the Baghdadi Muʿtazilīs which his master, Mufīd, had adopted.49
Among the questions of the latter point, Murtaḍā fully endorsed the Baṣran 
Muʿtazilī view of human agency; human acts, he believes, are purely done by 
humans, without God intervening in any form.50 He vehemently argued, not only 
against pure determinists (mujbira) who adopted the blunt position that humans 
are mere helpless tools of God’s power whose acts are as unaffected by their 
efforts as are their colors or bodily traits, but also against the upholders of ac-
quisition (kasb) who attempted to tread a middle-path between what they saw as 
the two extremes of absolute human independence and helplessness. Murtaḍā’s 
position was to deny the intelligibility of acquisition, while still equating it, if it 
is to be given any meaningful content, to pure determinism in that they both boil 
down to infringement on God’s justice and disavowal of human power.51 Like-
wise, Murtaḍā’s moral theory shows his acceptance of the Muʿtazilī view that the 
moral value of certain acts is known independently from revelation.52 
He, nonetheless, parted from the Muʿtazilī theory of divine justice on the 
question of divine help (luṭf); while adopting the doctrine of divine help as de-
fined by the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs, he pushed it farther to make it the cornerstone 
of his theory of the necessity of the Imāma as a means of bringing people closer 
to salvation due to the moral benefit accruing from the presence of an infallible 
leader of the community in whom authority and political power reside.53 In light 
of that, he might be considered the main influence behind the Imāmī position 
that the Imāma is necessary not to guarantee the complete transmission of religi-
ous law, but to preserve the moral order of society. He also rejected the Muʿtazilī 
dogma of the Threat (waʿīd ), i.e. the inevitability of God punishing sinners in the 
hereafter, arguing that it is not morally problematic to pardon grave sinners – and 
48 For the Muʿtazilī context of the epithet, see Gimaret 2011: passim; see its recurrence in 
Murtaḍā’s works in reference to Imāmīs too, as in Murtaḍā 1986: 4: 40; Murtaḍā 1997: 205–206; 
Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 397–398, 3: 110.
49 See the comparison in McDermott 1978: 373–394.
50 Murtaḍā 2000: 63–64, 449; Murtaḍā 1998b: 93.
51 Murtaḍā 2000: 68–69, 461–462, 468, 476; a briefer version in Murtaḍā 1998b: 44, 96.
52 The most elaborate discussion in Murtaḍā 2000: 303–367; a brief expression in Murtaḍā 
2009: 78.
53 Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 47, 99; Murtaḍā 1990a: 410; Murtaḍā 1998b: 191–192; Murtaḍā 1995: 35–36; 
Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 309–310, 2: 294.
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thus God might do it,54 a scenario whose ultimate execution is seen through the 
effect of the intercession (shafāʿa) of the Prophet and the Imams.55
In the above points of concurrence and disagreement with Muʿtazilī thought, 
Murtaḍā’s writings betray a strong influence of his elder contemporary, the 
great Muʿtazilī theologian of the Baṣran school Qāḍī al-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār al- 
Astrabādī (d. 415/1024).56 The phrasing of the two authors is almost identical in 
many instances in cases of both agreement57 and disagreement58. Also, Murtaḍā’s 
main work on the Imāma, al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma, was written as a rebuttal against 
the corresponding volume of al-Mughnī, with sharp criticisms59 and copious quo-
tations60 provided by Murtaḍā before he embarks on his refutations; the same can 
be said, though to a lesser extent, about his al-Dharīʿa61.
54 Murtaḍā 1990a: 509–521; Murtaḍā 1998b: 151–155.
55 Murtaḍā 1990a: 505–509; Murtaḍā 1998b: 158–158; Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 306; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 
1: 131, 148–151; Murtaḍā 1998a: 1: 217, 489, 503, 2: 155, 168–169. 
56 Ibn al-Murtaḍā 1969: 117 (probably following Jishumī 1973: 383) claims that ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
was one of Murtaḍā’s teachers; Jishumī adds that the studentship was in Baghdad upon ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār’s return from pilgrimage; Madelung 1985 dates it in 389/999. But Murtaḍā never alludes 
to such a connection even in al-Shāfī, despite the lengthy polemic against ʿAbd al-Jabbār. In 
addition, Murtaḍā’s brother Raḍī mentions being a student of ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself; Raḍī 
1967: 48, 180, 362. Jishumī might be confusing the two brothers, since he does not mention Raḍī 
therein. But if Murtaḍā did study under ʿAbd al-Jabbār, then it must have been for a short time, 
which explains why other biographers of Murtaḍā refrain from listing ʿAbd al-Jabbār among his 
teachers. 
57 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 474 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 6{1}: 11.
58 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 322–324 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 17: 52–53.
59 According to Murtaḍā, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s methodology suffers from his unfair, inaccurate or 
even uninformed presentation of Imāmī views (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 43, 73, 86–87, 96–98, 137, 167–168, 
179, 210, 215, 318, 3: 72, 4: 117; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 18, 31–35, 37–38, 56, 69–70, 75, 79, 
91–92, 181, 336), in addition to his facile use of slander against his opponents (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 
38, 90; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 13). To show his ability to reciprocate such methodology, 
Murtaḍā surveys many of the peculiar views ascribed to early Muʿtazilīs, many of which were 
renounced by later generations; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 90–96. Another problem with ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s 
methodology is in his use of sources, as he seems to either misunderstand the authors’ intentions 
or worse, to deliberately manipulate (taḥrīf) the quoted text to serve his position – as Murtaḍā 
tries to show by quoting those sources; Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 247, 321, 4: 249, 256, 347; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
1966: 20{1}: 138–139, 155–156, {2}: 50, 89. Also, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s use of terminology, according to 
Murtaḍā, is imprecise; Murtaḍā 1986: 4: 216, 236; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{2}: 20–26, 45–47.
60 See for example Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 76–83, 103–107, 143–145, 204–205; 2: 14–21, 26–36, 56–57, 
125–126; 3: 5–7, 18–20, 23–25, 63–64; 4: 14–17, 32–36, 90–94, 110–113.
61 In the introduction to al-Dharīʿa, Murtaḍā states that the book is unprecedented because his 
views on jurisprudence are not fully shared by any author. Nonetheless, he mentions that many of 
these problematic questions were covered in his now lost Masāʾil al-Khilāf and in his discussion 
of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s al-ʿUmad (both edited texts of al-Dharīʿa mention it under its less commonly 
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4
Murtaḍā’s position on the question of divine decree and determining is, as has 
been mentioned, identical to that of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs. Murtaḍā considers the 
question part of the debate on divine justice which he deems complementary to 
divine unicity as the two essential components of sound doctrine;62 this position 
is to be read in his various theological works, be they in the form of books – with 
extremely elaborate discussions – or shorter treatises where his order of priorities 
cannot be mistaken63. In addition to his discussion of the problem in his various 
works of undisputed authenticity, the aforesaid treatise entitled Inqādh al-Bashar 
min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar – solely dedicated to the question of human agency in 
relation to divine will – is also ascribed to him. 
There are three editions of this treatise:
1. Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar wa-Yalīh Istiqṣāʾ al-Naẓar fī al-Qaḍāʾ 
wa-l-Qadar. Edited by ʿAlī al-Khāqānī. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Rāʿī, 1935.
2. “Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar.” In: Rasāʾil al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. 
Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Ādāb, 1966, 51–124. This has 
been reproduced in Rasāʾil al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. 
Qum: Dār al-Qurʼān al-Karīm, 1985–1990, 2: 175–247.
3. “Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar.” In: Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa-l-Tawḥīd. 
Edited by Muḥammad ʿAmāra. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1988, 1: 283–342.64 [First 
edition, Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, 1971].
circulated name, al-ʿUmda, although other manuscripts retained the title al-ʿUmad; see Gurjī’s 
edition of al-Dharīʿa, Murtaḍā 1985: 1: 5n5). Not only does Murtaḍā object to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s 
jurisprudential views, but he also expresses strong complaints about the latter’s methodology in 
al-ʿUmad, though he refrains from mentioning names; Murtaḍā 2009: 29–31, 544.
62 Thus a general account (ijmāl) of the precepts of religion would reduce them to only two: 
unicity and justice; the first includes the discussion on divine essence and attributes while all the 
remaining precepts can be subsumed under justice; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 165–166.
63 In Murtaḍā’s two full theological works, al-Dhakhīra (with al-Mulakhkhaṣ as its first part) and 
Sharḥ Jumal al-ʿIlm wa-l-ʿAmal, the discussion on divine justice takes up 427 out of about 970 
pages in the former and 84 out of about 210 pages in the latter, although topics subsumed under 
this title vary in the two works. 
64 While the first two editions seem to have been motivated by hardly more than mere interest 
in Imāmī theology, as shown in their respective place of publications and the identity of the 
editors (both Imāmī clerics), further considerations underlie the production of the last edition. It 
is published as part of a collection of four texts from leading figures of different Muslim schools 
of thought (Sunnī – as presented on the cover-page, Muʿtazilī, Zaydī and Imāmī). The editor, 
Muḥammad ʿAmāra, in his lengthy introduction, makes it clear that the purpose of assembling 
these texts is to show that Muslims unanimously share the belief in free will; such a universal 
view, he argues, was dominant even before the translation of Greek philosophy (pp. 8–9). The 
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Other authors have mentioned the treatise under slightly different titles such as 
Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Qaḍāʾ wa-l-Qadar,65 Īqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-
Qadar66 and Munqidh al-Bashar min Asrār al-Qaḍāʾ wa-l-Qadar67.
But there is good reason to doubt the authorship of the treatise, as shall be 
explained presently. Despite the existence of another work written under the title 
Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar by Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992),68 
it must not be confused with the work in question, as its surviving text shows. 
Therefore, the discussion below excludes the possibility of this text being a misi-
dentified version of ʿĀmirī’s work69.
4.1 Synopsis of the content
Following the classical formulaic expressions thanking God and praising His 
messenger and his household, the author turns to address an anonymous re- 
quester who asked him to dictate a treatise on divine decree and determining. The 
reason is that the people of al-Nīl70 – all of its commoners and most of the rest – 
have been led astray as to believe in determinism, mainly due to their reliance on 
endorsement of reason and free will are indispensable tools to help the progress of the Arab-
Muslim nation in all respects: political, scientific, intellectual and moral (pp. 38–42). The ideo-
logical coloring of such rhetoric cannot be mistaken; one must bear in mind that it was written 
during the early 1970s when the then dominant discourse of leftist-Arab nationalism was starting 
to give way to the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. The strength of both discourses is 
readily felt in the introduction; their later fortunes are also reflected in the career of ʿAmāra 
himself, a prolific author of more than 200 works who subsequently drifted towards a much more 
religious worldview; see for example his recent Izālat al-Shubuhāt for an accurate assessment 
of his current positions since the book spans his conceptual world, offering 147 definitions of 
various terms. Paradoxically, having edited Murtaḍā’s work at some point earlier in his career, 
ʿAmāra resorted to a blatantly anti-Shīʿī – particularly Imāmī – rhetoric in recent years (as in 
ʿAmāra, 2010: 471–473, 523–529, 549–551), which triggered strong responses by Imāmī scholars; 
see for example, Diāb 1997: passim.
65 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 106; ʿĀmilī 1965: 2: 183; Baḥr al-ʿUlūm 1984: 3: 183; Amīnī 1977: 4: 266.
66 See the introduction to Murtaḍā 1990b: 49.
67 Majlisī 1983: 1: 11; Ṭahrānī 1983: 23: 150, 267. It is worth mentioning that Majlisī 1983: 90: 1–97 
has preserved the aforementioned Risālat al-Muḥkam wa-l-Mutashābih.
68 Rowson 2011: passim. 
69 The editor of ʿĀmirī’s collected treatises, Saḥbān Khulayfāt, notes that the text reflects his 
peculiar style, especially regarding the verb-gender agreement; ʿĀmirī 1988: 222–223. 
70 The most likely place to be meant by the author is the town of al-Nīl in the countryside of 
Kūfa, as attested by the phrasing which leaves the impression of a town or city thus named; the 
other two options are rivers, to which the author is unlikely to refer in the feminine voice or to 
make a construct such as ʿawāmm al-nīl and khawāṣṣihā; see Ḥamawī 1997: 5: 334–339.
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traditions of unknown provenance or equivocal meaning or because of confused 
understanding of some Qurʾānic verses. [177–178]
The author, while affirming the complexity of the problem, stresses that 
the starting point of the whole discussion must be knowing what ought to be 
said of God and what ought not; only then can one distinguish between the right 
and the wrong positions. He then provides a succinct exposé of the history of the 
debate on the identity of the party responsible for human sins and the nature of 
human agency. According to him, the root of the controversy is the view voiced 
by some people who first ascribed human sins to God; in early days, the whole 
debate was restricted to this question. This group was immediately denounced by 
the scholars of the time. [178–180]
Later, the discussion developed into a more complex debate, pertaining to 
the createdness of human acts and the nature of agency and power. Erroneous 
views ascribing acts of God eventually branched into three main ones, all being 
determinist: (1) absolute determinism, in the sense that God creates everything 
and humans, being but tools of divine will, are utterly powerless; (2) that God cre-
ates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a prior power that they have 
and (3) that God creates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a power 
created in humans simultaneous with the occurrence of the act. The last view, the 
author claims, is the most common among all determinists. [180–183]
The people of the right faith are aware that all Muslims agree on a number 
of arguments that set Islam apart from wrong religions. Nevertheless, these 
people are also mindful of the myriad disagreements among Muslims. Matters 
of disagreement can be analyzed by reason, then checked with the yardstick of 
the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Prophet so that the right may be sifted from 
the wrong. An obligation then falls upon the people of the right faith to spread 
their call, since the other position leads to all sorts of heinous attitudes, such as 
believing in the possibility of God committing evil acts, being like his creatures 
and disbelieving the prophets. Then a brief dogma on the unicity of God is stated; 
it rejects anthropomorphism, denies God’s corporeality and upholds that the 
Qurʾān is not pre-eternal. [183–189]
The core question of the treatise, i.e. God’s justice, is then tackled. The author 
believes that God never obligates people to the impossible; He only holds them 
accountable for what they have done. Moreover, it cannot be that He does vile acts 
committed by them, such as injustice and instances of illicit behavior. The au- 
thor’s opponents, on the other hand, allow that God obligate people to do what 
they cannot do and punish them afterwards; also, these opponents have no qualms 
about ascribing to God vile acts that appear in this world at the hands of humans, 
despite Qurʾānic statements to the contrary. The logical conclusion of this posi-
tion, he claims, is that God is more considerate towards His enemies than His 
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friends; the latter cannot trust His goodwill despite their efforts, whereas the 
former can always hope for it regardless of their sins. [189–193]
The hardships and material happenings of the world are created by God; but 
they cannot be called evil (sharr) as these might be in fact instances of wisdom 
and justice. Evil, in the form of sins, is effected by humans due to the whispering 
and temptation of the devil; this, in turn, is supported by ample scriptural evi-
dence from the Qurʾān and the sayings of the Prophet. [193–203]
The author then moves to provide rational, i.e. independent from scripture, 
arguments for his understanding of God’s justice. The first basis of the argument 
is that whoever does an act merits the corresponding attribute arising from being 
its agent; whoever lies is a liar, whoever does injustice is unjust and so on. But no 
one can describe God as such, so He must not be taken as the agent of such acts. In 
addition, the agent of vile acts is more blameworthy than any other party in rela-
tion to these acts, i.e. whoever commands them is less blameworthy than whoever 
does them. So ascribing them to God would make Him blameworthy and He can no 
longer blame humans for these acts. Therefore, God is neither the sole agent nor 
does He have any share of agency in relation to these acts; this goes both against 
pure determinists and against the upholders of acquisition who still allow 
that God be responsible, one way or another, for the creation of acts. [203–207]
Following is a list of questions, built around scenarios designed to corner the 
opponents unless they relinquish their position. In this context, it becomes clear- 
er that the opponents are not pure determinists but the upholders of acquisition, 
as all the questions aim to force them into adopting the position of pure determi-
nists – which they must be disavowing – or accept the author’s proposition on 
sole human agency not subject to divine intervention. The core of all these scena-
rios is the problematic position that God is unjust; he can create people’s sins 
and punish them, or lie to people and hold them accountable for believing these 
lies. To deny one’s creation of his own acts is to deny the evidence of senses and 
thus should not have been elaborately discussed had it not been for the ignorance 
which clouds the other party’s judgment. [207–216]
Having attacked his opponents’ position, the author moves on to defend his. 
For this, he explains away linguistic difficulties accruing from certain Qurʾānic 
passages pertaining to the notion that God is the creator of everything, divine 
decree (qaḍāʾ), as well as the meaning of guidance (hudā ) and being astray 
(ḍalāl ). In all such cases, God is understood to be responsible for creating the 
beings of the world and ordaining the good acts of humans in it. As for the twin 
concepts of guidance and being astray, the true understanding is that God points 
out the way of guidance and punishes humans for being astray from it if they 
choose to do so. An elaborate list of relevant Qurʾānic verses is accounted for, 
with the author’s interpretation of each. [216–229]
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This leads to a discussion of the apparent conflict between divine will and 
human agency seen in the Qurʾān; here, the author points out the theological 
difficulties arising from accepting the proposition that God wills vile acts, espe-
cially in relation to consequences affecting moral theory. He then proceeds to re-
concile his understanding of divine omnipotence and human will without sacri-
ficing either, which is the classical problem of the author’s position. For this, he 
goes over a copious survey of the occurrences of will and its derivatives in the 
Qurʾān. [229–239]
Finally, the treatise concludes with a long survey of sayings, anecdotes and 
short comments on Qurʾānic verses from the Prophet and early Muslim authori-
ties to support the author’s viewpoint on divine decree and divine will in relation 
to human acts. [239–247]
5
5.1 Analysis
The general content of the treatise agrees with Murtaḍā’s thesis that it is only 
humans who effect their acts and that God is in no way intervening in them. In ad-
dition, the criticisms of the other viewpoint also concur with many of his attacks 
on the upholders of the opposite position. However, despite such an agreement, 
analysis of the content in light of Murtaḍā’s corpus reveals discrepancies on many 
levels – leading to (1) stylistic, (2) terminological, (3) conceptual, (4) sectarian 
and (5) bibliographic problems. Though not amounting to a radical deviation 
from Murtaḍā’s initial position on this question, these problems contribute not only 
to question the authenticity of authorship, but even to develop a negative judg-
ment on the matter. Below is a succinct discussion of these various discrepancies. 
(1) Stylistic Points
The style of the treatise, conspicuously different from Murtaḍā’s, casts doubt on 
its authenticity; already noticeable in the early sections of the text, this dissimi- 
larity increasingly unfolds in various stylistic aspects. (1.1) The author employs 
rhymed prose (sajʿ ) frequently,71 although it rarely appears in Murtaḍā’s proli- 
fic output, even the literary compilations – not to speak of legal and theological 
71 Aside from the opening lines which, although heavily rhymed, may be seen as a natural 
venue for sajʿ, see for example Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 183, 186, 189, 190, 191, 193, 196, 216, 226, 
235.
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works. (1.2) Also, the phrasing is more relaxed, unlike Murtaḍā’s succinct sen- 
tences. (1.3) In addition, the passionate polemical spirit, mostly hostile and fer-
vent,72 is not to be seen in his works, usually characterized by a very cerebral tone 
even when touching on most sensitive topics and taking uncompromising posi-
tions, as noted in his discussion of the Imāma;73 the same can be said about the 
tone of admonition dominating certain sections74. (1.4) Another stylistic aspect is 
the author’s repetition of refrains at the end of sections,75 which is not to be seen 
anywhere in Murtaḍā’s writings.
(2) Terminological Points 
The use of certain terms is also foreign to Murtaḍā’s output. (2.1) This is evident 
in the author’s conspicuous preference for the phrase ‘our Lord’ (rabbunā) in re-
ference to God, as is obvious from its frequent occurrence;76 on the other hand, 
Murtaḍā very rarely uses it, except when quoting other texts, as observed from 
surveying his corpus. (2.2) Also, the author uses the terms ḥamd and ajr for praise 
and reward respectively,77 whereas Murtaḍā consistently sticks to madḥ and 
thawāb78. (2.3) The terms ‘People of the Qibla’ (ahl al-qibla)79 and ‘the Religion 
of the People of the Qibla’ (dīn ahl al-qibla)80 in reference to Muslims and Islam 
respectively are frequently used; nevertheless, Murtaḍā seems to use the first 
sparingly and only in legal contexts81 or quotations,82 while never the second.
(2.4) In a couple of instances, the author uses afāʾīl – as the plural form of 
fiʿl – for ‘acts,’83 although this form seems to never appear in Murtaḍā’s corpus, 
72 See for the example the section vilifying determinists; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 189–191, 236.
73 As, for example, in Murtaḍā’s style protesting what he considers an unfair and dishonest 
representation of the Imāmī position. See also how he treats the problem of the occultation of 
the Twelfth Imam, while aware of the potential weakness of the doctrine and how non-Imāmīs 
mocked it; Murtaḍā 1995: 33–35; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 293–294.
74 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185–186.
75 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 191, 197, 201, 203, 207, 223–224, 226, 239 (where he reiterates that he 
is concerned with keeping the text within reasonable length); Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 208, 209, 
211, 212, 213, 215 (where he asks the reader to reciprocate the arguments of the opponents against 
them); Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 193 and 228 (where he stresses that no friend of God would trust 
Him nor would His enemy fear Him).
76 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 177, 187, 189, 195, 205, 217, 218, 227, 231.
77 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 206, 230, 233.
78 See for example the taxonomy in Murtaḍā 1990a: 276–277; Murtaḍā 1998b: 131–132.
79 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 184, 185, 187.
80 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 209, 210, 212, 215.
81 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 506, 512; Murtaḍā 1998c: 302.
82 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 159; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 94, 2: 93, 4: 321; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 178.
83 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 180, 181.
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an absence most noted throughout his discussion of the question of human acts. 
(2.5) The phrase ‘Knowledgeable People of Unicity’ (ʿulamāʾ al-tawḥīd )84 seems 
not to have been used in Murtaḍā’s corpus, since he prefers ‘People of Unicity’ 
(ahl al-tawḥīd) in this regard85. (2.6) The word miskīn is used in reference to an 
individual’s weak mental ability or lack of knowledge;86 this usage, although 
metaphorical and rare,87 is avoided by Murtaḍā who does not even propose it as 
an option in relation to its possible meanings in certain Qurʾānic contexts.88
(2.7) The author refers to the Ashʿarīs as ashāʿira;89 however, Murtaḍā does 
not use this word, even in his lengthy discussions of theological controversies 
where this group – or those who would be thus dubbed – is taken as the main 
rival. In his extant corpus, the only time he comes close to using the term ashāʿira 
is when he speaks of “the attributionists, followers of al-Ashʿarī” (al-ṣifātiyya 
aṣḥāb al-ashʿarī )90. (2.8) For the determinists, the author uses terms derived 
from both roots, J-B-R (mujbira,91 jabriyya92) and Q-D-R (qadariyya)93 – the latter 
being more frequent. Nevertheless, Murtaḍā is univocally on the other side of this 
usage preference; he is consistent in his choice of J-B-R derivations referring to 
his adversaries.94
(2.9) Throughout the text, the only phrase used in reference to Imams is “the 
Imams of guidance” (aʾimmat al-hudā),95 an expression unusual in Murtaḍā’s 
writings as it does not seem to appear anywhere in his output. (2.10) The author 
uses mashīʾa and irāda equally and interchangeably in speaking about God’s 
will.96 True, Murtaḍā deems the two synonymous;97 but he almost restricts his 
84 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181.
85 Murtaḍā 1986: 178; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 397, 3: 125.
86 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 233.
87 Ibn Manẓūr 1967–1981: S-K-N in the sense of being in a bad condition.
88 See his discussion of Q19:79 in Murtaḍā 1986c: 179–180; this, of course, casting aside the 
more technical aspect pertaining to the legal discussion on eligibility to benefit from alms, where 
the term retains the sense of material want and poverty.
89 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 183.
90 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 4: 27.
91 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 190.
92 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 243.
93 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 190, 242, 243.
94 Murtaḍā 2000: 316; Murtaḍā 1998b: 99; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 212, 409; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 
48, 499, 2: 211; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 83, 86, 4: 317; Murtaḍā 1998c: 98. The only exception occurs in 
Murtaḍā 2009: 507 where the discussion is semantic but not polemic, related to how the verb ‘to 
believe in’ (yarā) is used.
95 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 177.
96 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 192, 236, 239.
97 Murtaḍā 2000: 367–369; Murtaḍā 1990a: 600; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 507–509, 2: 78.
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use of the term mashīʾa to quoting Qurʾānic verses where the verb (shāʾa, yashāʾ ) 
appears, or to the formulaic expression “God willing” (bi-mashīʾat allāh); using it 
to refer to the theological concept of God’s will is not in harmony with his style as 
he consistently sticks to irāda instead98.
(2.11) The phrase ‘the default state of our reason’ (fiṭrat ʿ uqūlinā ),99 laden with 
connotations, is not used by Murtaḍā. The term fiṭra he takes to mean the way 
something is created (khilqa);100 thus it would only have a meaning in this con-
text if Murtaḍā believes that reason can be altered. But for him, reason is strictly 
defined and is not susceptible to changes that would take it far from its default 
state: it is a subset of knowledge (ʿilm), dealing with types of knowledge whose 
goal is to help a person acquire the knowledge of his religious duties and perform 
them as ordained;101 being necessary knowledge, all of these types are effected in 
us by God and are thus unchangeable102. Therefore, the word fiṭra in the phrase, 
based on his jargon, is redundant.
(3) Conceptual Points
(3.1) Enumerating the various groups of determinists, the author makes a distinc-
tion between the position of Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (fl. ca. 110/728–200/815)103 and that of 
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Najjār (d. ca. 230/845).104 Although both agree eventually that 
it is God who creates the human act, the disagreement has to do with whether the 
human power to act (istiṭāʿa) is created prior to the act or simultaneously with it; 
the followers of Ashʿarī belong in the latter category.105 Nevertheless, Murtaḍā 
seems to have a different understanding of the question where he lumps these 
two figures under the same school and ignores the question of human power; 
Ashʿarī, he states, has a view distinct from both.106 (3.2) In addition, it is worth 
noting that the author and Murtaḍā have different names to enumerate the main 
theologians pertinent to the discussion, which would be a strange occurrence if 
done by the same author.107
98 See for example the discussion in Murtaḍā 2000: 343–395.
99 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.
100 Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 74–75.
101 Murtaḍā 1990a: 121–122; Murtaḍā 2000: 453.
102 Murtaḍā 2000: 333.
103 van Ess 2011: passim.
104 Nyberg/Athāmina 2011: passim.
105 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181–182.
106 Murtaḍā 2000: 449–450.
107 Compare Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181–182 and Murtaḍā 2000: 449–450; the two texts have in 
common the name of Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) in addition to the aforesaid Ḍirār b. ʿAmr and 
 536   Hussein Ali Abdulsater  
(3.3) The line of reasoning is also different from Murtaḍā’s, as in placing ratio-
nal arguments last in enumeration, preceded by the Qurʾān, Prophetic traditions 
and consensus,108 or in making rational speculation subservient to scriptural re-
quirements109. This order is not Murtaḍā’s standard line of reasoning in theology, 
given some of his categorical theological positions. For Murtaḍā, the question of 
human agency belongs to the realm of moral principles deducible by unaided 
reason; it relates to the axioms that it is vile to obligate to the impossible (qubḥ 
al-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq) and to do injustice (ẓulm) in the form of punishing some- 
one for an act of which he is not the agent. These axioms are accepted by all 
rational beings, regardless of their religious beliefs and independently from any 
revelation. Questioning them would jeopardize the whole structure of religion, 
since it opens the door for the possibility of God’s committing all forms of vile 
acts, eventually leading to deceit which undermines the reliability of revelation, 
as the classical Muʿtazilī argument – endorsed by Murtaḍā – goes.110
(3.4) Then we are faced with the problem of using non-multi-attested re-
ports (akhbār al-āḥād). (3.4.1) The author’s objection to his opponents’ reliance 
on equivocal reports, without him mentioning that these are non-multi-attested, 
is conspicuous.111 Murtaḍā usually points out this problem as his main argu-
mentative tactic as seen from surveying his writings on different theological 
questions,112 since he invokes it based on epistemological reasons rooted in his 
understanding of knowledge and the means to acquire it113. (3.4.2) But not only 
does the author fail to invoke this objection in his opponents’ faces; rather, the 
divergence from Murtaḍā’s position is made even starker by the author’s extreme 
reliance on non-multi-attested traditions to buttress his own arguments.114 Since 
these reports cannot produce certain knowledge, they are insufficient in matters 
of secondary importance such as the particulars of religious law, let alone the 
foundations of doctrines which are the subject of the treatise.115 But even if the 
Najjār. But the author mentions Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833), Muḥammad b. Ghawth and Yaḥyā 
b. Kāmil (d. mid-third/ninth century); as for Murtaḍā, he lists the names of Ḥafṣ al-Fard (fl. late 
second/eighth century) and Ṣāliḥ Qubba (fl. third/ninth century).
108 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 197. 
109 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.
110 Murtaḍā 2000: 310, 319–322; Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 142.
111 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 178.
112 Murtaḍā 1990a: 358–360; Murtaḍā 1998b: 181–184, 187; Murtaḍā 1995: 48–49; Murtaḍā 1985–
1990: 1: 116–117.
113 Murtaḍā 2009: 354–358; Murtaḍā 1990a: 351–355; Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 68–69; Murtaḍā 1985–
1990: 1: 64–66, 2: 336–341.
114 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 201–203, 239–247.
115 Murtaḍā 2009: 380–381; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 33–35, 94–95.
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validity of these reports is granted, the controversy in question belongs solely 
to the realm of speculation about God which, according to Murtaḍā’s theology, 
must not depend on revelation, for the reasons enumerated above, i.e. the logical 
precedence of establishing the vileness of deceit over the reliability of any report, 
no matter how well established; so the recurrent use of these traditions stands in 
contrast to his general approach.116 
(3.5) Moreover, the author’s view on the legitimate source for divine names 
and attributes seems to have been different from Murtaḍā’s; he is more inclined 
to rule that revelation and not reason is the source of these names and attributes,117 
whereas Murtaḍā confines the role of revelation to prohibiting certain names of 
God that reason would otherwise have legitimized.118
(3.6) In addition, the author argues from a pure linguistic standpoint; that 
is to say that the agent of an act of injustice is unjust (fāʾil al-ẓulm ẓālim), which 
leads to the situation – supposedly unacceptable to the opponent – that ascrib- 
ing acts of injustice to God would legitimize calling Him unjust. The same line 
of argument is also used for other derivations of vile acts such as instances of 
purposelessness and corruption in relation to their agents and other acts that, 
though not vile, cannot be ascribed to God such as instances of compliance and 
obedience.119 This logic runs contrary to Murtaḍā’s reasoning as attested in his 
writings where he stresses the point that concepts enjoy logical precedence over 
terms and not otherwise.120
(3.7) The analogy of obedience to kings with that to God, usually used by de-
terminists to argue that it infringes on God’s omnipotence not to be obeyed by his 
creatures, is rejected by the author. He judges such an analogy fallacious on sev- 
eral grounds, the first being that the king lacks authority, power and knowledge: 
he is in no position to bring people under moral obligation, nor is he able to un-
conditionally deliver the consequences of acts nor can he asses the proper mag-
nitude of reward and punishment.121 Murtaḍā deals with the same scenario in his 
theological writings; nonetheless, he does not bring up these objections. Rather, 
his rejection of the analogy is based on the fact that the king, unlike God, is likely 
to be affected by his subjects’ disobedience.122 That this answer is used by the 
116 Murtaḍā 2000: 478–479.
117 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 188.
118 Murtaḍā 2000: 190, 201, 218–222, 392–393; Murtaḍā 1990a: 571–604.
119 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 203–204.
120 Murtaḍā 2000: 327–328.
121 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 232.
122 Murtaḍā 2000: 390–391.
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author as his second choice123 indicates a different order of argumentative priori-
ties and thought processes than Murtaḍā’s. 
(4) Sectarian Points
Certain aspects of the text reflect an attitude that does not easily fit into an Imāmī 
discourse. (4.1) The author speaks favorably of some groups and individuals who 
are not so received in the Imāmī tradition, although to various extents. (4.1.1) He 
uses the term ancestors (salaf ) in a laudatory tone,124 which is not usually the 
case in Murtaḍā’s – or Imāmī writings in general. (4.1.2) In addition, there is 
the positive reference to the Companions, the Followers (al-tābiʿūn), and the sub-
sequent guided generations who follow in their steps,125 all of which being ex-
pressions alien to Imāmī literature with its predominantly negative view of these 
times and individuals126. 
(4.1.3) This divergence from the Imāmī spirit can be read in the many tradi-
tions the author relates on the authority of the famous Companion Abū Hurayra 
(d. 57/676–677) who is considered particularly infamous by Imāmīs, Murtaḍā 
not being an exception, for more than the theological reasons used to stigma-
tize other Companions.127 (4.1.4) The whole work concludes with an episode from 
none other than the second caliph ʿUmar, whereby the author urges the readers 
to consider the example of ʿUmar’s reaction to heavy obligations.128 Given Mur-
taḍā’s views on the Companions in general,129 and ʿUmar in particular,130 it is 
extremely unlikely that he defers to his authority. (4.1.5) Moreover, a number of 
individuals are praised both for being knowledgeable (ʿulamāʾ) and among the 
first to have rejected the claim that God creates people’s vile acts; although it is 
plausible that Murtaḍā did praise some of these individuals, even against the 
general Imāmī ethos, it is highly unlikely that he lauded all of them.131 
123 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 232.
124 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.
125 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 187.
126 See Kohlberg 1976b: particularly 96–98.
127 Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 174–175; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 3: 284. For other early Imāmīs see for example, 
Ṣadūq 1983: 19; Mufīd 1993b: 78; Mufīd 1993a: 23.
128 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 246–247. 
129 Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 126–130, 173; Murtaḍā 1990a: 495, 535–536; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 336–343, 
2: 251; Murtaḍā 1998b: 235.
130 Murtaḍā 1986: 3: 272–273; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 290–291, 3: 148–150.
131 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 179; for example Muṭarrif b. ʿAbdullāh, who is reputed to not have 
been a supporter of ʿAlī, or even to have disliked him. In addition, his extremely hagiographic 
biographies in Sunnī sources, with the absence of any reference to him having believed that God 
has nothing to do with human sins, suggests that he probably did not hold such a view in the 
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(4.2) Another indicator is to be seen in the fact that the author never quotes 
any of the Imams qua Imams; that ʿAlī is mentioned here should be seen in the 
context of invoking the Companions’ authority.132 (4.3) Certain formulaic expres-
sions are strange to the Imāmī spirit. An example is the phrase “the Qurʾān is 
our Imam/book” (al-qurʾān imāmunā);133 true that this may still be taken as a 
legitimate, though infrequent, use of the term ‘imām’ to mean ‘a book,’134 but this 
would not be an Imāmī’s first choice, let alone its almost polemical, anti-Shīʿī 
tone in the context of sloganeering at the beginning of the statement of dogma. 
The whole problematic aspect of the potential sectarian affiliation of the con-
tent discussed above cannot be easily ascribed to cautionary prudence (taqiyya), 
if one still takes Murtaḍā as the author. Many reasons militate against such an as-
sumption. First and foremost, Murtaḍā’s social status made him immune to such 
a practice, especially given the favorable vicissitudes of time under the Būyids. 
Second, according to his own legal views, this is not an instance of permissible 
cautionary prudence, since the author opens by stating that he is replying to the 
inquiry of a community of people about religious matters.135 Third, even if cau- 
tionary prudence is granted, Murtaḍā’s style would still allow him a better and more 
elusive way of expressing that which he would not accept as an Imāmī, whereas 
the current text does not show any nuisances – or even an effort in that direction 
– meant to hide a different attitude of the author than what the prima-facie read- 
ing of the text suggests.136
There remains, of course, the possibility that he was addressing a non-Imāmī 
audience and writing this way to persuade them, but his biography does not 
betray any interest in addressing other communities aside from debating their 
authors. In addition, such an assumption is untenable because Murtaḍā’s reputa-
tion as a leader – or at least one of the leaders – of the Imāmī community would 
make any such tactic useless in the eyes of this presumed audience, especially 
first place, given the hypersensitivity of the subject which does not allow for great toleration. So 
it is unlikely that Murtaḍā refers to him positively given these two issues, let alone the possible 
factual mistake regarding his actual position on divine decree and determining; on him, see Ibn 
Saʿd 1998: 7: 141–146; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd 1959–1964: 4: 94; Dhahabī 1993: 4: 187–195; Dhahabī 1987: 
6: 481–483; Ibn Ḥajar 1995: 6: 205–206; Ibn Ḥajar 1984: 10: 157–158.
132 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 241–242.
133 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 187.
134 Ibn Manẓūr 1967–1981: ʾ-M-M.
135 See Murtaḍā 1990a: 562–563 for his views on cautionary prudence, where he restricts its 
valid application to instances of coercion.
136 In Murtaḍā 1990a: 562–563, Murtaḍā stresses the plausibility of resorting to equivocation 
to avoid blunt lies. This attitude, one expects, can only translate in a certain phrasing, very 
different from the straightforward one seen in the current text.
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given his declared positions on sensitive points such as the status of the Com- 
panions and the question of the Imāma.
(5) Bibliographic Points
Examination of the bio-bibliographic sources also leaves one with serious doubts 
regarding Murtaḍā’s alleged connection to the current treatise. (5.1) Thus, an- 
other pointer that undermines the ascription of the work to Murtaḍā is that the 
author mentions a book of his entitled Ṣafwat al-Naẓar as a reference work dedi-
cated to the interpretation of ambiguous verses on the question, suggesting that 
it is both elaborate and well-known. This title, however, is neither to be found in 
the accounts of Murtaḍā’s works, nor does he speak of such a work despite his 
habitual references to his other works by name,137 nor is the content of any of 
his works congruous with this allusion. His complementary al-Mulakhkhaṣ and 
al-Dhakhīra, which contain a lengthy discussion on human agency, cannot be 
meant here because of their content which does not correspond to the author’s 
remark, in addition to the fact that Murtaḍā makes frequent references to them, 
only by this title;138 so it is unlikely that the title Ṣafwat al-Naẓar be another title 
for either al-Mulakhkhaṣ or al-Dhakhīra. Assuming it is a different work while still 
wanting to ascribe it to Murtaḍā would pose two questions: (5.1.1) first, why Mur-
taḍā, contrary to his habit, never alerts readers to such a book in his responses to 
pertinent questions where he mentions al-Mulakhkhaṣ or al-Dhakhīra and (5.1.2) 
second, why the author of Ṣafwat al-Naẓar and Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-
Qadar mentions neither al-Mulakhkhaṣ nor al-Dhakhīra. 
Admittedly, the last argument suffers three problems; first, it is an argumen-
tum ex silentio; second, there is the possibility of al-Mulakhkhaṣ and al-Dhakhīra 
not having yet been compiled at the time of writing the treatise in question; third, 
there is the possibility that the title Ṣafwat al-Naẓar be initially the title of a work 
by Murtaḍā that is now known by some other name. Nonetheless, the argument 
is proposed to deal with these challenges within the limitations of the current in-
formation. It is still a reliable way to have a reasonable assessment of authorship, 
given Murtaḍā’s frequent self-referencing in his works and the late date of some 
of them from which any mention of Ṣafwat al-Naẓar is still absent. The margin 
of error is there, but the fact that neither this treatise mentions any known work 
137 Murtaḍā 1997: 442; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 84, 122, 128, 131, 310, 311, 315, 330, 336, 338, 363, 
371, 379, 390, 412, 419, 2: 317, 339, 3: 81, 85, 87, 90, 109, 111, 117, 136, 149, 254, 4: 21, 74, 36, 131, 352; 
Murtaḍā 1995: 31, 36, 61, 71, 73; Murtaḍā 1998c: 277, 307, 349, 351.
138 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 224; See Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 143, 363, 376, 390, 3: 81, 333; Murtaḍā 
2009: 393, 395, 396 where Murtaḍā, having discussed similar questions, refers his reader to 
al-Mulakhkhaṣ as the main relevant work.
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by Murtaḍā nor any of his works mention this treatise, coupled with the author’s 
decision to reference himself in a way that does not quite fit into Murtaḍā’s biblio-
graphic records, should minimize this margin.
(5.2) Still, one must account for the possibility of the work having been writ-
ten by Murtaḍā at an early stage in his career. A very early date of compilation may 
explain why he never refers to any of his works, assuming that all of them were 
written after this treatise; such a hypothesis would also take care of the difficulty 
arising from the discrepancy in style and terminology, since one can then propose 
that the writing style and terminological jargon of a young Murtaḍā were reason-
ably different from his later ones, even as early as al-Shāfī139 whose style and ter-
minology already betray considerable departure from the work under study. But 
this possibility can also be safely excluded by looking into Murtaḍā’s bibliogra-
phy. The early list of his works, prepared by his student Muḥammad b. Muḥam-
mad al-Buṣrawī (d. 443/1051)140 and ratified by Murtaḍā himself in Shaʿbān 417/
September 1026 mentions all his works composed up to that time, enumerating 
57 items in total.141 But neither Inqādh al-Bashar nor Ṣafwat al-Naẓar appear in 
the list; it is extremely unlikely that Murtaḍā fails to point out the absence of two 
early works of his, with one of them – i.e. Ṣafwat al-Naẓar – being supposedly an 
elaborate compilation.142
(5.3) It should also be noted that the earliest source to list Inqādh al-Bashar 
among Murtaḍā’s works is Maʿālim al-ʿUlamāʾ by Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192). 
It is the last item on the list, preceded by al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq with which it 
shares two aspects: first, al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq does not appear among Mur-
taḍā’s works in any list before Ibn Shahrāshūb’s; second, the content of al-Ḥudūd 
wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq is even more problematic in its relationship to Murtaḍā’s authen-
tic writings.143 Also, Murtaḍā’s close associates such as the aforementioned Ṭūsī 
139 His al-Shāfī is definitely the earliest of Murtaḍā’s extant theological books, as he refers to it 
in almost all of them; Murtaḍā 1998c: 300, 307; Murtaḍā 1990a: 409; Murtaḍā 2009: 431; Murtaḍā 
1985–1995: 61, 73. In his legal work Murtaḍā 1997: 442 he refers to al-Dhakhīra in which he refers 
to al-Shāfī.
140 On him see Baghdādī 1997: 3: 355–356; Amīn 1997: 9: 404; Khūʾī 1990: 15: 323.
141 The earliest appearance of this list is in Iṣfahānī 1982–1995: 4: 34–39 where the author 
claims to be copying from a manuscript with both Buṣrawī’s and Murtaḍā’s handwriting. 
Another published version is based on Ḥusayn Maḥfūẓ’s copy of a manuscript; it appears in 
Murtaḍā, 1998a: 1: 126–132. The two versions are almost identical, with very minor differences 
probably due to misreading. 
142 No work with such title was found despite my diligent searches in various venues.
143 As a preliminary indicator, the author of the current article was able to find 27 definitions 
of terms provided in al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq that differ from Murtaḍā’s explicit definitions of the 
same terms; this aside from stylistic and less stark contradictions.
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and the famous Imāmī bio-bibliographer Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Najāshī (d. 450/1058)144 
fail to mention any of these two texts in their bio-bibliographic entries of Mur-
taḍā.145 That both works make their first appearance in this relatively late com-
pilation, their position at the end of the list and their problematic content leave 
us with either one of two explanations: that the two treatises were added later by 
manuscript handlers or – in case it is Ibn Shahrāshūb himself who listed them 
among Murtaḍā’s works – that the ascription to Murtaḍā must have taken place 
within 150 years from his death.
6 Conclusion
The relevance of this article is to show how Murtaḍā’s thought might have been 
misrepresented due to the similarities between his viewpoints and those of 
Muʿtazilī masters on the particular issue of divine decree and determining, which 
constitutes the core of the current treatise. Given the other positions taken by 
its author, the ascription of the text to Murtaḍā would certainly leave an in- 
accurate impression of his thought. On many matters where Murtaḍā sought to 
highlight the difference between his position and that of Muʿtazilīs, the author 
seems to adopt a view that contradicts Murtaḍā’s, thus allowing for the miscon-
ception that Murtaḍā represented a form of Imāmī theology that was more ac-
commodating of non-Imāmī viewpoints. It is hoped that the evidence presented 
against such an ascription would help situate Murtaḍā’s thought within its con-
text without having to make sense of the apparent divergence from mainstream 
Imāmī views that the treatise reflects.
Bibliography
ʽAbd al-Ghaffār, ʽAbd al-Rasūl (1996): al-Kulaynī wa-l-Kāfī. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
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Abdulsater, Hussein (2011): “Dynamics of Absence: Twelver Shīʿism during the Minor 
Occultation”. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 161:2: 305–335.
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wa-Shadharātuh al-Falsafiyya. Edited by Saḥbān Khulayfāt. Amman: al-Jāmiʿa 
al-Urduniyya.
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Bayhom-Daou, Tamima (2005): Shaykh Mufid. Oxford: Oneworld.
Busse, H. (1969): Chalif und Grosskönig; die Buyiden im Iraq (945–1055). Beirut; Wiesbaden.
Cahen, Cl. (1979): “Buwayhids”. Early Islam, Second Series 1: 1350.
Calder, Norman (1989): “Doubt and prerogative: the emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī theory of 
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Iṣfahānī, ῾Abdullāh Afandī (1982–1985): Riyāḍ al-ʿUlamāʾ wa-Ḥiyāḍ al-Fuḍalāʾ. Edited by Aḥmad 
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al-Tawḥīd 10.2–3: 193–225.
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Abū al-Qāsim Gurjī. Tehran: Tehran University Press.
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Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1990b): al-Intiṣār. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr 
al-Islāmī.
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and Memory in Medieval Islam. Edited by Farhad Daftari. London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 
128–161.
Raḍī, al-Sharīf Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn (1967): al-Majāzāt al-Nabawiyya. Edited by Ṭāha al-Zaynī. 
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al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī on ʿĀshūrāʾ, 391 A.H”. Journal of Arabic Literature 38: 293–323.
Strothmann, R. (1979): “Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh.” Early Islam, Second Series 3:254.
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